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On the Discursive-Material Enactment of Criminal Violence: How Death and Injury Come to 
Matter to the Criminal Law1 
Abstract 
This article seeks to challenge the prevailing view that violence is legally actionable because 
human bodies are capable of experiencing pain, injury and death. Drawing on literature in the 
area of new materialism, this article demonstrates how pain, injury and death are not 
ontological properties of the flesh-and-bone body, but rather, they are the effects of how 
violence is made sense-able, knowable, as part of the criminal legal process. Here, I examine 
four of the materializing practices through which violence becomes sense-able to us: crime 
scene photography, forensic pathology, legal judgements, and bodily performance. If the 
effects of criminal violence can be traced to the discursive practices by which we observe, 
measure, think and speak about bodies, it becomes much harder to sustain the view that 
human violence is exceptional because the human body is special. 
Keywords: Posthumanism, Agential Realism, Posthuman Violence, Criminal Violence, Onto-
Epistemological Body, Karen Barad, new materialism.  
Introduction 
Several years ago, in a postgraduate course for which I was a guest lecturer, we were discussing the legal 
implications of high-tech industries such as virtual reality and robotics, and I asked my students whether 
we could expect human-machine interactions to attract criminal legal attention. Namely, did we foresee a 
future in which violence directed at or inflicted by intelligent machines or avatars in virtual reality – say 
virtual rape or robotic murder2 - would need to be criminally regulated?  As expected, many of my students 
found the suggestion offensive. They argued that violence against machines, against things, no matter how 
 
1 I am immensely grateful to Dr. Bal Sokhi-Bulley (Sussex) and Dr. Lucy Finchett-Maddock (Sussex) for their 
comments on an earlier version of this paper. My sincere thanks also go out to Stephen K. Martin for offering 
recommendations during the planning stages of this paper.  All remaining errors are solely my own.  
2 A number of authors have already identified these as emerging issues that require legal attention Hallevy, When 
Robots Kill: Artificial Intelligence under Criminal Law (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 2013). 
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much they resembled humans, could never compare to an attack against real bodies (i.e. bodies made of 
flesh and bone).  Real bodies ‘feel pain’, they said, real bodies suffer, real bodies can, and do, die. For my 
students, it was these properties of the flesh-and-bone body – the capacity to experience pain, injury and 
death – that justified the criminalization of violence.  
My first thoughts were that pain, injury and death, as concepts, were not as straightforward as my students 
were making them out to be. Often their ‘wrongness’ and our desire to limit their presence are context-
dependent. We have evidence that at least some people find meaning and pleasure in their real or perceived 
pain and suffering.3 Some of us see injury as a form of self-expression4 and disagree on precisely what 
constitutes ‘injury’ in the first place5. Many of us do not agree on the precise boundaries between life and 
death; we describe certain types of experiences as a ‘fate worse than death’6 or a kind of ‘social death’7. We 
cannot even agree on the physical manifestations of death. Is it the cessation of brain activity? Is it organ 
failure that results in permanent loss to circulatory or respiratory function? Is it an irreversible loss of 
consciousness, or simply just a loss of awareness?.8 And certainly, all of these debates have informed the 
criminal law in one way or another. So, if the meaning of pain, injury and death shifts based on context and 
personal experience, how can we think of them as properties of the body?  And if they are situated, body-
interior processes, how can we be certain that they actually exist in order to justify punishing its inflictors? 
This article draws on a very specific understanding of how pain, injury and death exist, namely that they are 
brought into being by the very practices that make them sense-able (and thus intelligible) to us as embodied 
entities. This article, therefore, puts the spotlight on material arrangements that, in most legal accounts of 
criminal violence, remain in the background, as passive data that is interpreted by people who are party to 
the legal process. Here, however, I show how this data itself moves us; how these material arrangements 
 
3 Gross, 'The pleasure of pain', Forensic Examiner 15 (2006), pp. 56.; Pitchforth, 'Emotional Response to Auditory 
and Visual Stimuli', (2010).; Favazza, Bodies under siege: Self-mutilation and body modification in culture and 
psychiatry (JHU Press, 1996). 
4 First and Fisher, 'Body integrity identity disorder: the persistent desire to acquire a physical disability', 
Psychopathology 45 (2012), pp. 3-14. 
5 Featherstone, 'Body modification: An introduction', Body & Society 5 (1999), pp. 1-13. 
6 Patsavas, 'Recovering a cripistemology of pain: Leaky bodies, connective tissue, and feeling discourse', Journal of 
Literary & Cultural Disability Studies 8 (2014), pp. 203-18. 
7 Sweeting and Gilhooly, 'Dementia and the phenomenon of social death', Sociology of Health & Illness 19 (1997), 
pp. 93-117. 
8 Halley and Harvey, 'Medical vs Legal Definitions of Death', JAMA 204 (1968), pp. 423-5. 
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do not simply imply or evidence pain, injury and death, but actually constitute it. How they, as Schuppli 
argues, affectively engage us.9 It is clear then that I follow a materialist tradition that equates meaning with 
meaning-making;10 whereby matter and events have no meaning, no reality, that is separate from the 
practices through which we study them, know them.  The current research draws on new materialist 
methodologies, particularly the work of Karen Barad, to address a contemporary social issue. I believe that 
there might be some cynicism amongst those writing in the area of law (corporeal feminists perhaps being 
the exception),11 that the ethics of non-anthropocentricity that is embraced by new materialist and 
posthumanist theory could be useful for restructuring social institutions that have historically been 
established for human societies, with ‘human’ interests in mind. This article is then a testament to the idea 
that it is possible to critique the ‘human’ at the core of these institutions without denying the relevance and 
significance of their presence.  
In the first part of the article I consider three different discursive-material practices: crime scene 
photography, forensic pathology and legal judgements. In the last sense, I do not consider legal judgements 
in terms of its interpretation of events, but how the words of judges actually visualize criminal violence, 
bring it into being. I also, in this first section, consider how the lived realities of pain, injury and death are 
performed by those who suffer criminal violence. I explain how the victims’ bodies give us a material 
account of how the effects of violence are borne out in the day-to-day. I analyse how, through these 
practices, violence is made audible, visible, odoriferous, tangible for the purposes of criminal regulation and 
argue that it is these practices that give pain, injury and death tangible form, ‘being-in-the-world’ meaning, 
as more than just abstract, body-interior, concepts. This mattering of pain, injury and death happens through 
a number of collaborations between different technologies, techniques and technologists – pain may be 
enacted through an interaction between flesh and flash photography in one instance, or by the radiographic 
images of brain processes in another. Each practice gives us a different account of pain’s existence as a 
temporally and spatially situated thing. Consequently, we cannot describe pain, injury and death as properties 
 
9 Schuppli, Material Witness: Media, Forensics, Evidence (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2020). pp. 4-5. 
10 As suggested by Barad in her reading of Bohrian quantum physics; that concepts are not “ideational but rather 
actual physical arrangements” Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of 
Matter and Meaning (Durham, Duke University Press, 2007). p. 147.. 
11 Murphy, 'Feminism on Flesh', Law and Critique 8 (1997), pp. 37-59. 
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of the body, any body, but rather as discursive-material enactments that arrange the body in relation to 
other bodies, matter, and ideas so that they become sense-able to the rest of us.   
In the second part of the article I draw on these findings to challenge the idea that the criminal law should 
not apply to nonhuman violence because nonhuman bodies are incapable of feeling pain and/or 
experiencing injury and death. I argue that, in making these claims, my students were wrongly mistaking 
how we come to know the body, for what the body is.  I draw specifically on the work of new materialists such 
as Barad, Braidotti, Haraway and Mol and their ideas about the materiality of phenomenon, the material 
arrangement of bodies, and practice and performativity as embodied engagement, to consider how a 
practice-oriented understanding of pain, injury and death (pain, injury, and death as socio-material 
phenomena) can produce a more inclusive, posthuman, understanding of criminal violence.   
The Discursive-Material Enactment of Criminal Violence 
When a body or weapon makes forceful contact with another body, the consequences of that action is felt 
by the body that is dealt the blow.  This body knows what violence is by seeing the knife that perforates 
their skin, watching the blood leak out of their arm, feeling the physical pain and fear as this happens, and 
living the (emotional, psychological, physical) changes that come about as a result of this act. This act is real 
because it is sense-able. But for the rest of us, who are not present in that moment and cannot therefore 
sense that particular act of violence, we may find it difficult to affirm its presence, its existence. This 
becomes particularly problematic when we are charged with the task of determining whether an act of 
violence is legally punishable which, in most common law jurisdictions, requires us to make judgements 
about whether the violence was harmful. So how does an act of violence, an act that its legal arbiters are 
never part of, have never physically felt the effects of, come to matter? How does it come to harm?  
The reality of criminal violence is based on the extent to which the rest of us can be made to see, touch, 
smell and hear it; when it mobilizes our senses and causes us to feel and behave in a particular way.12  These 
materializing practices bring criminal violence into being; they enact it. And our belief in its existence is 
 
12 Gerdes, Wieser and Alpers, 'Emotional Pictures and Sounds: A Review of Multimodal Interactions of Emotion 
Cues in Multiple Domains', Frontiers in Psychology 5 (2014), pp. 1351. 
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strengthened, our feelings and behaviours reinforced, when our affective engagement with it is shared by 
others. As Baerveldt and Voestermans note, “norms are norms not by virtue of their reflective articulation, 
but precisely because of their affective nature. As affective beings, we are already in a world that makes 
normative demands on us and others”.13 So the question becomes, what sorts of practices bring criminal 
violence into being, for us? 
Criminal law theorist, Joel Feinberg, claims that the harmfulness of criminal violence stems from its 
potential to cause a loss to one’s welfare interests, one’s stake in the well-being of their bodies, of 
themselves.14 In his view, violence is wrongful on the basis that all human beings share an interest in 
maintaining their own physical health, “the integrity and normal functioning” of our bodies, avoiding 
disfigurement, the absence of pain and suffering, and avoiding fear and anxiety. For the most part, we have 
an interest in maintaining our physical health and existence.15  In short, violence is wrongful because it 
causes pain, injury and death. So clearly, violence that is criminal must be enacted in a way that allows us 
to visually and aurally identify harm in the form of pain, injury and death. I argue, that the pained, injured, 
dead body that attracts the criminal law’s attention, what I refer to as the bio-juridical body,16 is enacted 
through discursive arrangements of images, sounds, smells, and tactile stimuli that allow us to visually and 
aurally confirm the presence of violence. Accordingly, criminal violence and the bio-juridical body are co-
constitutive, they are both co-enacted by the investigative, forensic, judicial processes that materialize 
violence for the purposes of regulating it.  But criminal violence also has a ‘lived reality’, it is performed 
and materialized by the bodies that endure it, sometimes in ways that may contradict the manner in which 
it is enacted by forensic pathologists, crime scene photographers, and judges.  
 
13 Baerveldt and Voestermans, 'Culture, Emotion and the Normative Structure of Reality', Theory & Psychology 15 
(2005), pp. 449-73. 
14 Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Volume 1 Harm to Others (New York, Oxford University Press, 
1986). pp. 37-8. 
15  Op. cit., p. 37. 
16 I have developed this term using Barad’s understanding of the onto-epistemological body as the body that is 
produced by the very modalities that we use to study it.  In this case, the ‘biological’ body that is the target of 
criminal violence is produced by the juridical processes by which its pain, injury and death are enacted. Barad, p. 
381. 
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Crime Scene Photography 
The crime scene photo is perhaps the first visual snapshot of the aftermaths of an act of violence. Meant 
to give investigators and pathologists information about the crime scene, crime scene photos put us face-
to-face with battered, oozing, ashen and immobile bodies;17 bodies displayed in contorted, unnatural and 
unexpected positions, and often on public display.18 Special lighting, particular kinds of lenses, camera 
flashes, coloured filters, techniques of bracketing,19 operate to make explicit the parts of a scene that matter. 
Wounds and bruises become pronounced. Bites, tears, terrified and frozen faces are framed, isolated, and 
enlarged. With richer and more intense colours, sharper and clearer images, these visualising practices enact 
criminal violence differently than oral testimony.20  They show, in a way that language cannot, that bodies 
rupture, they spill out, they leak into their surroundings in bits and pieces.  They show us what happens to 
bodies when they remain outdoors, exposed to heat, wind, nonhuman animals, oxygen and water; they 
show bodies in fragments and in states of disintegration.21 It is no surprize then, as indicated by a number 
of researchers, crime scene photographs have the potential to evoke extreme emotional reactions, and 
controversially sway jury opinion about the culpability of the individual on trial, not on the basis of what 
they show but how they show it.22 
Crime scene photographs enact violence not only by reference to bodies, but space. They provide visual 
data about the arrangement of the scene of violence itself.  Items haphazardly strewn across rooms, sheets 
pulled from beds, bodies arranged in unnatural positions, enact criminal violence as disordered and 
chaotic.23  Images of blood-spattered walls and bullet fragments scattered across floors bring about a 
criminal violence that is coercive and forceful and involves struggle.  In some instances, it is the space in 
 
17 Egan, Ted Bundy Crime Scene Photos, CrimeOnline, 2018) 2020. 
18 Redmond, 25 Vintage Murder Scenes from Old New York, New York, All That Is Interesting (ATI), 2018) 2020. 
19 Duncan, Advanced Crime Scene Photography (Houston, TX, CRC Press, 2015). pp. 61-2. 
20 Busch, 'Photographic Evidence', DePaul L. Rev. 4 (1954), pp. 195. 
21 Thompson, 'The Role of the Photograph n the Application of Forensic Anthropology and the Interpretation of 
Clandestine Scenes of Crime', Photography and Culture 1 (2008), pp. 165-84. 
22  Op. cit.; Bright and Goodman-Delahunty, 'Gruesome Evidence and Emotion: Anger, Blame, and Jury decision-
making', Law and human behavior 30 (2006), pp. 183-202. 
23 Egan, Jeffrey Dahmer Crime Scene Photos, CrimeOnline, 2019) 2020. 
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which violence is shown to have occurred (rather than a violated body) that determines its ‘criminal’ 
nature.24  
Interestingly, one of the concerns voiced by victim advocates in the United States is that crime scene 
photographs produce a desubjectified, dehumanized bio-juridical body, and that living photographs of the 
dead victim should thus be permitted in homicide trials.25 Interestingly, what these claims suggest is that, 
in the context of criminal violence, our understanding of what constitutes death and life comes down to 
bodily performance; dead bodies are ones that lie there, motionless, often “in portions” and fragments 
while living bodies are ones that smile, demonstrate emotion, act, and move. As one juror noted: 
the picture of her dead, her eyes open. That was another shocking thing too…You don’t think 
of these things when you see a dead body on TV or in the movies or whatever. You usually 
don’t see them with their eyes open, you see them closed. Here is this lifelike looking face, 
looking at you, but this person is dead.26 
How we know death, therefore, does not relate back to the body’s ontology, but the socio-material practices 
through which death is represented – as motionless bodies with open eyes – representations that may run 
counter to the viewers expectations of how dead bodies should behave based on how they have seen dead 
bodies act, for example, on television. Photographs give a durability and tangibility to violence that even 
the physical body of the victim cannot sustain because bodies heal, bodies forget, bodies disintegrate and 
disappear. Our consumption of crime scene photography takes place visually, with our bodies, but in causing 
us to experience the effects of an act of violence viscerally, emotionally (e.g. as ‘shock’), it also takes place 
through our bodies.27   
 
24 Bell, 'Abortion Crime Scene Photography in Metropolitan London 1950–1968', Social History of Medicine 30 
(2017), pp. 661-84. 
25 Rychlak, 'I see Dead People: Examining the Admissibility of Living-Victim Photographs in Murder Trials', Vand. 
L. Rev. 69 (2016), pp. 1423.; Singh, Kumar, Nanra and Kumar, 'Why Is The Crime Scene Photographed?.... There Is 
Not A Single Answer!', Internet J Forensic Sci 5 (2012), pp. 1-10.; Wyatt and Whitley, Murder Victims have Rights, 
and Jury Should See their Picture, Tennessean, 2015). 
26 Antonio, 'Stress and the Capital Jury: How Male and Female Jurors React to Serving on a Murder Trial', Justice 
System Journal 29 (2008), pp. 396-407. 
27 Which explains our definition of these images as ‘gruesome’, obscene, and offensive, because they have the 
potential to evoke disgust and visceral, sometimes violent, bodily reactions in those who view these images. Thomas, 
'Utah Rule of Evidence 403 and Gruesome Photographs: Is a Picture Worth Anything in Utah', Utah L. Rev. (1996), 
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Crime scene photographs are not merely transcriptions of a reality, a visual encoding of a given, immutable 
past, but parallel realities. Nagosky explains how one of the evidentiary disadvantages of the digital versus 
traditional photograph is that it is not accompanied by an ‘original’ or its negative which can help prove the 
content of the picture.  What he alludes to is the idea that photographs (and the image they portray) can 
have multiple ‘realities’.28  Because they reflect existing political discontents29 and are sometimes shot using 
the aesthetic trends of the time,30 they enact a bio-juridical body – by which I mean a pained, injured, dead 
body - that is situated in a certain space and time, culture and history; a bio-juridical body that derives its 
meaning from the performance of photography itself. As Bell explains, the contents of a crime scene photo 
(even when bodies are absent from the image itself) tells us something about how criminal violence exists. 
In the context of her research, an empty living room, littered with buckets, and sponges – things that are 
out of place – enacts illegal abortion as a clandestine, ‘backstreet’, dangerous-precisely-because-it’s-banal, 
kind of violence.31 In this way, crime scene photographs do not simply mirror a reality, but actually enact 
the reality(ies) they transcribe. 
Forensic Pathology 
Forensic pathology enacts a very different kind of criminal violence than crime scene photography.  Like 
crime scene photographers, forensic pathologists study the crime scene for clues about the cause and 
manner of death and injury. Their practice is scripted, in the sense that it is regulated by legal instruments 
like the Human Tissue Act (2004) and the Chief Coroner’s Guidance  and institutions like the Home Office 
Register of Forensic Pathologists, all of which govern how bodies may be handled. The pathologist studies 
criminal violence by looking at what happens on the surface of the body, within its interiors, and by taking 
account of relationships between the body, its constitutive parts like hair, nails, and skin, and the 
surrounding environment.  
 
pp. 1131, Douglas, Lyon and Ogloff, 'The impact of graphic photographic evidence on mock jurors' decisions in a 
murder trial: Probative or prejudicial?', Law and human behavior 21 (1997), pp. 485-501, Antonio, pp. 396-407.   
28 Nagosky, 'The Admissibility of Digital Photographs in Criminal Cases', FBI L. Enforcement Bull. 74 (2005), pp. 1. 
29 Bell, pp. 661-84. 
30 Bell, 'Crime scene photography in England, 1895–1960', Journal of British Studies 57 (2018), pp. 53-78. 
31 Bell, pp. 661-84. 
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By examining the body’s decomposition with reference to patterns of insect infestation and reproduction,32 
the deposit of fatty acids and soil,33 and the body’s exposure to environmental conditions such as wind and 
rain,34 forensic pathology pinpoints the approximate moment a subject ceases to exist. They enact a criminal 
violence which implies that ‘dead’ bodies react with insects, nature, and climate in a way that living bodies, 
bodies that can ‘act’ and ‘move’ and ‘think’, do not, would not. These ways of knowing and showing the 
victim’s (non)existence produce an understanding of human history – the temporal parameters of human 
life – that is inextricably entangled with the nonhuman world. Remarkably, forensic practices show, contrary 
to the purposes for which they are usually employed by the criminal law, that the body continues to act, 
continues to have the potential to affect and be affected by other matter, even after the cessation of ‘life’ 
in the way that the criminal law understands it.35   
Similar to the way crime scene photography operates, forensic pathology also shows us a criminal violence 
that is disordered and chaotic.  This is evident in the way that pathologists process a crime scene. Blood 
spatter analysis, for instance, with its focus on velocity, trajectory, intensity and force, using words like 
‘direction of travel’ and ‘speed’ to describe the flow of blood,36 and studying blood drops as evidence of 
body movement,37 enacts criminal violence as a frenzied, active event. This scene contrasts dramatically to 
pathological observations about lawful violence.  
(6)  The orientation and arrangement of the wounds over the left wrist are typical of 
self-inflicted injury. Also typical of this is the presence of small so-called ‘tentative’ 
or ‘hesitation’ marks.  
 
32 Lord and Rodriguez, 'Forensic Entomology: The Use of Insects in the Investigation of Homicide and Untimely 
Death', The Prosecutor (1989), pp. 41-8. 
33 Vass, Bass, Wolt, Foss and Ammons, 'Time Since Death Determinations of Human Cadavers using Soil Solution', 
Journal of Forensic Science 37 (1992), pp. 1236-53. 
34 Lord and Rodriguez, pp. 41-8. 
35 In her study of videographic evidence, Susan Schuppli interestingly highlights how dead bodies ‘act’ as digital objects 
not only by corroborating or refuting the testimonies of defendants and witnesses during a criminal trial, but through 
an affective engagement with their viewers. In this way, these digitized bodies produce a reality of the criminal event 
that does not require supplementary human explication or intervention. Schuppli, pp. 169-95. 
36 Akin, 'Blood Spatter Interpretation at Crime and Accident Scenes: A Basic Approach', FBI L. Enforcement Bull. 
74 (2005), pp. 21. 
37  Op. cit., p. 23. 
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(8) Other features at the scene which would tend to support this impression include 
the relatively passive distribution of blood, the neat way in which the water bottle 
and its top were placed, the lack of obvious signs of trampling of the undergrowth 
or damage to clothing. The location of death is also of interest in this respect as it 
is clearly a very pleasant yet relatively private spot of the type that is sometimes 
chosen by people intent upon self-harm.  
(9)  Many of the injuries over the left write show evidence of a well-developed vital 
reaction suggesting that they have been inflicted over a reasonable period of time 
(minutes rather than seconds or hours) before death.38  
 
As paragraphs (8) and (9) of the forensic report indicate, violence that is not criminal (e.g. self-inflicted) 
presents itself through a static and ordered environment (e.g. ‘passive distribution of blood’, ‘neat way in 
which the water bottle and its top were placed’, ‘lack of obvious signs of trampling’). Lawful violence is 
methodical and tentative, ‘inflicted over a reasonable period of time’. In the way that scenes are observed 
and measured, components of the body – for example the blood – appears agentic; it moves, tells a story and 
affects in cases of criminal violence, but just ‘sits there’, waiting to be seen and explained when it comes to 
lawful violence.  
Forensic pathology involves the study of criminal violence through the performance of invasive medical 
examinations, where bodies are split open, organs are studied and weighed. The body is investigated as a 
unit, but also as a constellation of parts (hair, nails skin), each acting differently to the surrounding 
environment. It is common practice for pathologists to record a found body’s internal temperature, 
decomposition rate, and rigor mortis, all of which enact death as a cold, immobile, rigid, disappearing body 
.  Pathologists have many tools at their disposal. Technologies such as magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), 
positron emission tomography (PET), and computerized tomography (CT), all of which create images of 
 
38 Hunt, Statement Witness: Forensic Pathology Report for David Christopher Kelly ed. Justice, London, Home 
Office, 2003), pp. 13-4. 
11 
 
the body’s insides – providing visual knowledge of its anatomy, physiological processes, and cellular activity. 
These technologies use three-dimensional detail to provide viewable information about the structure of 
organs and tissue, brain activity, and the (non)performance of the digestive, respiratory and circulatory 
systems.   
Through the use of contrast media and fluoroscopes radiographic images draw our attention to fractures, 
lacerations, and abnormal bodily processes. By using special dyes in the process of x-raying, organs can be 
made to look denser, allowing viewers to visually link (and thus locate) certain kinds of criminal violence 
(i.e. rape) to certain parts of the body (i.e. the female genital tract).39 This demonstrates to what extent the 
‘science’ of forensic pathology is co-materialized with crime and the sociocultural body. These images tell 
us how bodies should work, and when they no longer work. They, at once, enact death as loss of circulatory 
or respiratory function, the cessation of brain activity. And, as Annas’ reference to the Schiavo case 
demonstrates, these visual technologies can give us a very different, even contradictory understanding, of 
human life (and its cessation) than other material sources of knowledge like the photograph.40 The visual 
knowledge that radiographic images impart have the potential to overwhelm the oral testimony of experts 
who explain what these images show.41 They, in essence, generate a picture of what animacy and injury is, 
at least in terms of (human) physicality, and they often do so by treating bodies as things that are embedded 
in, and in constant motion with, their environment.  
Legal Judgements 
Criminal violence is also enacted by talking about it; spoken words make violence audible and visualisable. 
And the words that are used, how they connect things that they speak about, all have an effect on the kind 
of criminal violence that is brought into existence. As Barad claims “a performative understanding of 
discursive practice challenges the representationalist belief in the power of words to represent pre-existing 
 
39 Scott, 'X-ray Pictures as Evidence', Michigan Law Review 44 (1946), pp. 773-96. 
40 Annas, 'Foreword: Imagining a New Era of Neuroimaging, Neuroethics, and Neurolaw', American journal of law 
& medicine 33 (2007), pp. 163-70. 
41  Op. cit., p. 168.; Dumit, 'Objective Brains, Prejudicial Images', Science in Context 12 (1999), pp. 173-201. 
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things”.42 Accordingly, I am not speaking about legal judgements as the law’s description of what has 
happened in a particular context of violence, but as a performance of what violence becomes.  
There is no doubt that in each case here he battered his victim to death with that heavy 
hammer...The heads were smashed with repeated blows from that hammer and in the case of 
the daughter in addition he tied around her neck that ligature…that material ligature, so tightly 
that he could not remove it himself and I think even the ambulance men later had difficulty 
in removing it.43 
You remember [Dr. Bowen] told you that [the victim] had twelve separate lacerated wounds 
to his head, did not indicate necessarily to him twelve separate blows but certainly more than 
six blows. Not only were there these lacerations all over his head and face but the skull had 
been fractured, the facial bones had been fractured.  The Doctor’s words ‘the entire facial 
bones were extensively fractured.  There were broken fragments of denture in his mouth and 
his jaw had been fractured…’… That was what was done by the defendant.44  
The judge’s words draw distinctions between the different agencies at work.  Certain objects are given 
attention and scope, the hammer becomes an object of the law precisely because of its ability to fracture, 
and its material constituents (the steel head, the wooden handle) are only relevant to the law to the extent 
that they produce the effect of fracture.45 The judge’s words draw distinctions between objects and subjects 
by empowering some agencies the potential to speak (‘the Doctor’s words’), to control (‘that is what was 
done by the defendant’), some to be wielded into action (the hammer), and others to passively lie there, 
bones fractured, ‘fragments of dentures in his mouth’.  
The judge’s words do not focus on the same agencies (e.g. blood) and activities (splattering) as forensic 
pathology, yet they yield a similar enactment of death as broken, battered, fragmented bodies located in 
 
42 Barad, 'Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter comes to Matter', Signs: Journal of 
women in culture and society 28 (2003), pp. 801-31. 
43 R v. Gittens The National Archives, Supreme Court of Judicature, 1982) 862/A2/83, pp. Summing Up p. 7, para. 
C-D. 
44 The Queen v. Alan Wight, 1987) Trial Transcripts, pp. Summing Up p. 5, para. C-D. 
45 And these material consequences and constituents would be very different if, say, a carpenter was studying and 
talking about a hammer, where the strength of its head and its capacity to drive and shape wood would be what 
matters. 
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space. Through the words of the judge violence happens through the ‘blows’ and ‘lacerations’ the body 
endures, by the stamping that produces ‘fractured bones’ and ‘fragments of dentures’.46 Pain and injury are 
enacted as scalar activities quantified by reference to between ‘six and twelve blows’. By focusing its 
attention on certain activities, the number of blows inflicted on heads, the striking of the hammer, the 
words of the Doctor, the judge’s words enact a different kind of criminal violence than forensic pathology 
and crime scene photography. For one, the words of the judge establish people - not spaces, environments, 
and nonhuman animals - as the subjects of violence, as the things that act and move and affect.  
But the words of the judges do not stand alone. They are, of course, scripted by the statutes under which a 
defendant is charged, and of course by what has already been said by other judges in previous cases, and 
also by what has been said by other judges in other jurisdictions. Thus, there is an incorporeal dimension to 
every act of criminal violence that is visualized by the law. Violence is not only what is said by the judge, 
but also what is not said but nonetheless operates in the background as constraints on what can be said. The 
English law of rape, and its definition of rape as penile penetration, for instance, limits how bodies can be 
brought together in word within the confines of the courtroom. Thus, the judge’s words make visible the 
kind of violence the law itself sees. What ‘matters’ here is that people wield hammers that fracture bones 
and that subjectivities disappear when bodies break in irreparable ways.  But we cannot mistake how the 
law knows violence as the way in which violence (and its constituting bodies, matter, and ideas) exist. For, 
as we have seen in the previous sections, the agencies and objects that matter shift depending on the 
modalities by which violence is studied.  
Now, clearly, what is also relevant here is how violence becomes ‘criminal’ once subjected to the law’s gaze. 
Violence is not criminal at the moment it takes place, when one body connects with another. There is no 
inherent truth as to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of violence apart from the pronouncement of judges 
and juries. Criminal violence is brought into existence through the scripted words of the judge that direct 
the jury about the legal requirements for finding culpability, and when jury members deliver the verdict of 
‘guilty’. But, perhaps, one could argue that it is not even at this point that violence becomes ‘criminal’ 
 
46 Though authors such as Ramachandran problematizes the classification of this particular example as ‘injury’, given 
that it does not concern the body but rather property Ramachandran, 'Assault and Battery on Property', Loy. LAL 
Rev. 44 (2010), pp. 253. 
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because, in many cases, appeals are filed, cases are retried, verdicts may be overturned.  When new evidence 
becomes available, new objects, activities, and interactions may come to matter in the filing of appeals and 
the performance of new trials.  Certainly, one could also say that criminal violence is enacted at an entirely 
different moment for forensic pathology (e.g. when their investigations yield evidence which suggests an 
unnatural cause of death). And so, what is worth making very clear here, is that it is not the properties of 
the body that yield a finding of criminal violence (or violence itself). It is how bodies are performed, the 
agencies which are spotlighted, the activities that are materialized by criminal legal practice, the ideas that 
operate in the background as constraints on these performances and which enact the kind of violence the 
law wants us to see. 
The Lived Reality of Criminal Violence 
Criminal violence is not only mattered discursively, but also performatively. It has a lived reality, a 
‘becoming-violated’, where the body takes centre stage as the target of criminal violence. Certain kinds of 
conduct, and the body’s intra-action with particular kinds of matter (pressure, enzymes, gasses) cause blood 
vessels to break, blood to pool, skin to discolour, skin to break open, the insides of bodies to leak, faces to 
contort, bones to break, voices to grow shrill, eyes to tear up, bodies to swell, breathing to stop, pulses to 
disappear, muscles to stiffen, tissue to decompose, bodies to stink. The body does many things to perform 
violence, to make visible, audible, olfactible its presence.  In some contexts, it carries out these 
performances in collaboration with other matter, leaking across walls and tables, disintegrating through 
intra-active processes between enzymes and organs, bacteria and tissue, making sounds and producing 
odours which must be heard and inhaled in order to be. Performances which we, as the audience, as 
individuals who encounter them with our own bodies, categorize as pain, injury and death.  But the body 
becomes-violated in different ways. Sometimes the threat of force, the battering of bodies, does not 
produce shrill screams, but silence.47 Sometimes the application of extreme force does not cause bodies to 
break open or skin to discolour, but leaves lesions on the brain.48 Sometimes becoming-violated does not 
 
47 Pierce-Baker, Surviving the Silence: Black Women’s Stories of Rape (New York, WW Norton & Company, 2000). 
pp. 32-40. 
48 Adamsbaum, Grabar, Mejean and Rey-Salmon, 'Abusive Head Trauma: Judicial Admissions Highlight Violent and 
Repetitive Shaking', Pediatrics 126 (2010), pp. 546-55. 
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affect blood circulation and respiration, but results in a permanent loss of wakefulness.49 Bodily 
performances have the potential to drive legal understandings of pain, injury and death, manifesting in 
categories such as psychological injury, emotional damage, ‘brain-death’, which suggests that the criminal 
law has recognized the body’s agency in enacting violence in multiple ways. But what this also shows is that 
the criminal law is perfectly able to recognize that violence can have multiple realities.  
Importantly, as Mol suggests, “the reality of living with [criminal violence, for instance] isn’t exhausted by 
listing physicalities” like bruising, screams, and odours. “Apart from being a physical reality” criminal 
violence “has a meaning” for victims.50 The physicalities of violence shape the sufferer’s future conduct and 
interactions. The fear violence causes prevents people from leaving their homes51 and changing jobs or 
leaving the city they live in.52 The pain violence causes stops people from engaging in intimate sexual 
relations53 and to attempt suicide.54  The bio-juridical body appears very differently here than in crime scene 
photographs and radiographic images. These are bodies that avoid certain kinds of activity, settings, 
environmental conditions, and relationships. These are bodies that report self-abuse,55 and a kind of living, 
‘social death’, whereby the insides of bodies continue to function, but sufferers report feeling that they are 
unable to move or control its actions.56 In the way that violence is performed by bodies, pain and injury do 
not simply appear as tissue damage or bruises, but as fears, anxieties, anger, and guilt that cause bodies to 
behave and interact with others differently than they may have before. Accordingly, pain, injury and death 
are not only socio-material phenomenon by virtue of their discursive constitution and representation, but 
because their existence relies on how bodies perform them; how bodies conduct themselves in relation to 
other bodies, things, and the environment.  
 
49 McLean, 'Legal and Ethical Aspects of the Vegetative State', Journal of Clinical Pathology 52 (1999), pp. 490-3. 
50 Mol, The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice (Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 2002). pp. 7-8. 
51 Meyer and Taylor, 'Adjustment to Rape', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 50 (1986), pp. 1226. 
52 Qureshi, Rape: Social Facts from England and America (Stipes Publishing Company, 1979). 
53 Meyer and Taylor, p. 1226. 
54 Walker, Archer and Davies, 'Effects of Male Rape on Psychological Functioning', British Journal of Clinical 
Psychology 44 (2005), pp. 445-51. 
55 Sansone, Chu and Wiederman, 'Self-Inflicted Bodily Harm Among Victims of Intimate-Partner Violence', Clinical 
Psychology & Psychotherapy 14 (2007), pp. 352-7. 
56 Winkler, 'Rape as Social Murder', Anthropology Today 7 (1991), pp. 12-4. 
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Criminal Violence and the Posthuman 
My analysis in the preceding sections is meant to show that pain, injury and death - as the effects of criminal 
violence - do not have an underlying reality, or singular, universal meaning.  They are not effects which 
emerge as a result of particular features that human bodies possess. Pain, injury and death, within the 
context of criminal violence, are enactments that take place through an accumulation of and communication 
between different practices and performances including (but not limited to) forensic pathology, crime scene 
photography, legal judgements, and bodily performance. Barad refers to this process of accumulation and 
communication as one of causal intra-action, ‘intra’ in the sense that discursive practices are themselves 
indeterminate, open-ended and flexible.57 According to Barad’s theory of agential realism, it is the discursive 
practices - what she refers to as ‘apparatuses’ (because they involve the observation, measurement, and 
study of phenomena using specific technologies and techniques) – by which we study a particular 
phenomenon – forensic pathology or forensic science – that separates out and draws boundaries around 
the objects and relationships that matter. Thus, our apparatuses determine how criminal violence is enacted, 
what it becomes. In drawing its ‘agential cuts’, or the boundaries which set out the subjective and objective 
‘things’ of criminal violence,58 these apparatuses not only determine how we come to see pain, injury, and 
death, but also how we come to see the bio-juridical body (the kind of body that can be pained, injured, and 
killed). These apparatuses convey to us, among other things, that a pained body is one that has a brain that 
can be mapped; an injured body is one that has bones that can be broken; a dead body is one that has 
organs which can stop operating. Consequently, as she explains, “practices of knowing are specific material 
engagements that participate in (re)configuring the world”.59  
Taken separately each of these apparatuses yield a different kind of criminal violence: a lived criminal 
violence, a judicial, pathological, aesthetical criminal violence. But together, as material practices that are 
collectively part of the criminal law process, they begin to give both criminal violence, and its bodies, 
structure and form.60 Nevertheless, the sedimentation of these relationships into determinate boundaries, 
 
57 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning, pp. 170-8. 
58  Op. cit., p. 175. 
59  Op. cit., p. 91. 
60  Op. cit., p. 142. 
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physical properties (e.g. as fleshed bodies, as steel hammers) need not imply ‘closure’.61  Just as the effect 
of fracture can be brought about even if hammer heads are made of titanium or tungsten, the effects of 
death or pain can be enacted even if bodies are not flesh. It is our practices that bring matter and its specific 
properties into being.    
We have, until now, limited our study of criminal violence to human bodies, justifying our choice to do so 
by pointing to the human body’s ontology.  Yet, rapid technological development, ecological changes, 
environmental degradations, have made it clear to us that we can no longer treat ourselves and our bodies 
as exceptional, discrete, separate-from-the-world, self-contained beings. These developments affect our 
physicality and sociality. Thus, while the memory of these past materialisations, ones that gave ‘the human’ 
the specific form and meaning we have become accustomed to, will remain inscribed within our practice, 
they can be overwritten; we can become something other than what we have always been. For new materialists 
such as Barad, Braidotti and Haraway, our existence, in the face of these changes, is crucially dependent on 
our openness towards a non-anthropocentric ethics that sees being human as an embedded practice; 
entangled with the multiple (human and nonhuman) agencies at work within the universe.62  We must 
consider human experience and human phenomena as interlinked with the nonhuman. For new 
materialists, this shift in thinking requires that we direct our attention to the material conditions of our 
existence, and develop a more ethically-sound politics which recognizes that matter has vitality, it has 
agency, and thus has the potential to move us in ways that may be contrary to our interests and desires.63 
So, going full circle, how does all of this relate back to the initial concern about my students saying that 
avatars and robots cannot be the perpetrators or victims of violence because their bodies are incapable of 
being harmed?  Well, I believe here that my students were mistaking epistemology for ontology; treating 
the ways in which bodies are being done as if they were indicative of how bodies are.  And this outlook isn’t 
surprising. Latour, Barad, and Haraway have all noted in one form or another, that we wrongly focus on 
 
61 Barad, 'Diffracting Diffraction: Cutting Together-Apart', Parallax 20 (2014), pp. 168-87. 
62 Haraway, The Promise of Monsters: A regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/d Others ed. Grossberg, Nelson and 
Trieichler, New York, Routledge, 1992).; Braidotti, Posthumanism (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2015). 
63 Attala and Steele, Body Matters: Exploring the Materiality of the Human Body, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 
2019).; Coole and Frost, New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency and Politics, Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 
2010). 
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the steadfastness of ‘matter’ rather than mutable, plastic, flexible kinds of ‘mattering’,64 the processes by 
which we enact ourselves and the world around us.  Through this article I have sought to draw attention 
to these processes of mattering with the intention that we might, more critically, engage with the idea of 
criminal violence as a phenomenon that could include, indeed does include, more than just human bodies. 
The idea that robots, artificial intelligence, and avatars can never be human irrespective of how many human 
behaviours they exhibit treats ‘being human’ as something separate from looking and acting human; as if 
being human was determined by some metaphysical essence that human beings possess, rather than a 
subjective decision to recognize bodies as ‘human’ based on our sensorial encounters with them. Our 
history is littered with examples of how the measure of one’s humanity is founded on ideas about how 
bodies should look, smell, behave, and speak.65 While our bodies may sense things in its interior – chemical, 
molecular, cellular processes – these body-interior processes are only accessible to the rest of us (indeed 
even to the experiencing body itself) to the extent that they can be made visible, audible, olfactible and 
tangible. Even when our bodies actually sense pain, injury or death, these internal sensations have 
significance and meaning for us as embodied entities, bodies that are in the world, because they have an effect 
on how we interact with the world around us. As Mol explains, what is pain other than a sensation which 
makes it impossible for us to “climb stairs” and “go shopping”?66 And what gives a reality to the things 
happening inside our bodies are the various discursive-material practices that bring the inside outward, for 
others to sense, encounter, and interact with. Scarry writes: 
When one hears about another person’s physical pain, the events happening within the 
interior of that person’s body may seem to have the remote character of some deep 
subterranean fact, belonging to an invisible geography that, however portentous, has no reality 
because it has not yet manifested itself on the visible surface of the earth…Vaguely alarming 
but unreal, laden with consequence yet evaporating before the mind, because not available to 
 
64 Latour, 'Why has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern', Critical inquiry 30 
(2004), pp. 225-48.; Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York, Routledge, 
1991).; Barad, 'Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter comes to Matter', pp. 801-31. 
65 Tullett, 'Grease and Sweat: Race and Smell in Eighteenth-Century English Culture', Cultural and Social History 13 
(2016), pp. 307-22.; Bregin, 'Representing the Bushmen: Through the Colonial Lens', English in Africa 27 (2000), pp. 
37-54.; Lowrey, 'Dead to the World: Embodied Gender Transgression and the Loss of Humanity', eTopia (2008). 
66 Mol, p. 20. 
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sensory confirmation…the pains occurring in other people’s bodies flicker before the mind, 
then disappear…67  
But it is not just the pain of others, even our own pain dissipates unless it has material consequences; unless 
it prevents our bodies from acting in certain ways, or shapes the way that others relate to us. The reality is 
that even our own humanity is a series of material arrangements and engagements.  Our humanity is not 
defined by some immaterial, metaphysical essence – animacy, sentience, a soul, or whatever one may call 
it.  It is defined by what our bodies do, how they relate to the world around us, and what other bodies see, 
hear, smell, taste, touch our bodies doing, namely how we relate to one another as embodied entities.  But 
also, “as a consequence of how we become related to our surroundings within such movements, traces of 
their surrounding doings become inscribed in our bodies and influence the shaping of our actions in future 
encounters within our surroundings”.68 All matter, our bodies included, are always open to 
(re)configuration, what DeLanda refers to as matter’s potential for ‘morphogenesis’; we are part of an 
iterative ‘becoming’ of the world.69  Since the body is always in a state of transition it is “in an immediate, 
unfolding relation to its own nonpresent potential to vary”.  As a result, we are faced with the “paradox” 
that there is always “an incorporeal dimension of the body”70 which alludes us; a body that once was and a 
body that does not yet exist but is in the process of becoming. 
These conclusions suggest that, perhaps a more inclusive way of thinking about robotic, machinic and 
digital violence, is to recognize that all bodily phenomenon – including violence - irrespective of the kinds 
of bodies it involves (human and nonhuman), refers to the body’s material engagements with the world 
and how those engagements are observed, measured, thought about, and spoken of. From this perspective, 
 
67 Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York, Oxford University Press, 1985). p. 
3. 
68 Shotter, 'Agential Realism, Social Constructionism, and our Living Relations to our Surroundings: Sensing 
Similarities Rather than Seeing Patterns', Theory & Psychology 24 (2014), pp. 305-25.. Attala and Steele’s Body Matters 
undertakes a series of investigations that consider the co-constitution of bodies, matter, and the environment Attala 
and Steele.. For many new materialists this brings a special kind of focus on material relations as agentive processes, 
or as Bennett notes, the idea that matter possesses ‘vitality’ Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things 
(Durham, Duke University Press, 2010), Barad, 'Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How 
Matter comes to Matter', pp. 801-31, Braidotti, Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming (John 
Wiley & Sons, 2013)..  
69 DeLanda, 'Immanence and Transcendence in the Genesis of Form', The South Atlantic Quarterly 96 (1997), pp. 
499. 
70 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Duke University Press, 2002). pp. 3-5. 
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violence becomes posthuman; both mindful of the ‘human’ that has served to drive contemporary politics 
until now, but also conscious of the fact that what constitutes the human relates back to us, and the socio-
material practices that we engage in to bring that human into existence. So when my students say that robots 
and avatars cannot be harmed because they do not feel pain or experience mortality, what they must realize 
is that it is our anthropocentric discourses that tell us that violence can only harm when it leads to: organs 
that fail, brains that become inactive, bodies that contort, bones that break, odours that surface, tears and 
screams that emerge, bodies that avoid certain spaces, places, and relationships. Pain, injury and death mean 
very little to us apart from these representations and performances. Violence becomes ‘criminal’, to us, 
when we believe that, in certain contexts (e.g. in the absence of consent), these representations and 
performances breach acceptable limits about how we relate to one another and the world around us. This, 
we say, ‘harms us’.  Thus, criminal violence refers to how we are made to encounter bodies, through our 
senses, and how we believe those encounters affect our relationships to one another and the surrounding 
universe.  
If all violence refers to the body’s material engagements with the world, then recognising human-on-
nonhuman violence, and vice versa, is not about equating nonhuman bodies to human ones. It is about 
recognising that bodies are not the stable, determinate, self-contained ways of existing that we believe them 
to be. For what is a better example of this then metal and digital bodies that can perform tasks the same 
way flesh-and-bone bodies do? There is no static, physical, ‘human’. Rather, humanness is distributed; it 
proliferates across material arrangements that we may, through our practices, recognize as ‘human’ or 
‘human-like’.71 And this, here, is important because it also recognizes our potential - as stable-for-the-time-
being material arrangements of cells, water, minerals, proteins - to mutate, to change without compromising 
our humanness. Hayles has remarked that we, as a species, have always been, to some extent, ‘posthuman’ - 
that we have never existed alone, as self-contained, self-sufficient, fixed entities – but, this is perhaps even 
more so apparent today than ever before.72  We live in a world of smart environments, sex robots, fitness 
trackers, and digital living spaces.  Technology not only shapes our lived reality, but also our physicality. 
 
71 The perfect example is how we have used the techniques and technologies of neuroscience to show how animals 
have certain ‘human’ qualities such as animacy and sentience.  
72 Hayles, What Does it Mean to be Posthuman? ed. Nayar, Chichester UK, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), pp. 19-28. 
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Cryogenics, prosthetic limbs,73 artificial skin,74 all of this speaks to the social and physical plasticity of the 
human body. If our cognitive functions, moods, and behaviours can be performed by machines, and if our 
bodies and its biological processes can be swapped out for technological, synthetic, manufactured 
alternatives, what precisely is a human being?  
Perhaps then what might be a more fruitful way of thinking about humanity is not in terms of bodies but 
processes, “thinking through flows and interconnections”.75 We do not stand separate from the world 
around us, subjects in a world of objects, but are entangled within it. Subjectivity and objectivity are 
therefore not inherent categories of matter, but iterative processes.  Barad writes: 
Agency is ‘doing’ or ‘being’ in its intra-activity. It is the enactment of iterative changes to 
particular practices – iterative reconfigurings of topological manifolds of spacetimematter 
relations – through dynamics of intra-activity. Agency is about changing possibilities of change 
entailed in reconfiguring material-discursive apparatuses of bodily production, including the 
boundary articulations and exclusions that are marked by those practices in the enactment of 
a causal structure.76 
Thus, the human shifts through a series of movements, a series of practices, that slowly, steadily, and 
continuously reconfigure the boundaries, limits, and exclusions of humanness. As a result, in studying 
human phenomena – like criminal violence – we should refrain from concentrating our attention on a 
singular, bodied, notion of the human, for both the sociality and physicality of the human is consistently 
being challenged and reformulated. Rather, we should direct our gaze to the apparatuses, the material 
practices – through which that change takes place. In earlier sections of this paper I demonstrated how 
those material-discursive practice ‘mattered’ – how they jointly brought both the bio-juridical body and the 
effects of criminal violence into being. The fact that many of these practices relied on studying the body by 
reference to interactions between flesh, insects, and the environment – even when the physical body was 
 
73 Morimoto, Onoe and Takeuchi, Biohybrid Robot Powered by an Antagonistic Pair of Skeletal Muscle Tissue, 2018) 
3. 
74 Burke, Yannas, Quinby Jr, Bondoc and Jung, 'Successful use of a Physiologically Acceptable Artificial Skin in the 
Treatment of Extensive Burn Injury', Annals of Surgery 194 (1981), pp. 413. 
75 Braidotti, Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming, p. 2. 
76 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning, p. 178. 
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no more – suggests that there is a reality to criminal violence that both takes account of, yet exceeds the 
(allegedly) self-contained, inner processes of the ‘human’ body. In light of this, one could possibly say, that 
our practice of criminal violence has always, already been, posthuman, and it is simply time for us to finally 
recognize this.     
Conclusion 
It has never been my intention to argue that the criminal law should apply to nonhuman bodies. This paper 
was more meant to encourage us to think about precisely why and how it applies to human ones. In this 
paper, I have argued that the wrongfulness of violence, the idea that violence harms, cannot be traced to 
the human body’s ontology, but rather the modalities through which we observe, measure, talk about, and 
think about the human body.  Here I have analysed only a few of those modalities: crime scene 
photography, forensic pathology, legal judgements and bodily performance. I have argued that these 
material-discursive practices, when looked at more closely, expose precisely to what extent our bodies, and 
the violence they experience, are enacted by bringing flesh into contact with a number of different tools, 
technologies, and ideas.  Humanoid robots, artificial intelligence, and avatars, I believe, have helped to 
provoke a critical re-imagining of human existence as a process of becoming, or better yet, a becoming-with 
(technology, environment, climate, insects, animals, machine, etc). We are relational beings because for us 
to ‘be’, we must be in the world. And to that end, one could also argue that our embodied experiences, 
including criminal violence, are also relational.  Criminal violence is not rooted in a property of our bodies 
– sentience, or animacy, or agency – but filters down to choices that we have made, practices that we have 
undertaken, about how to relate to the world around us. And if this is the case, as I believe it is, then 
precisely the kinds of conduct which constitute criminal violence can also change. A posthuman 
understanding of criminal violence, therefore, would reimagine it as a series of enactments that make sense-
able the moral concern and responsibility we feel we ought to have to other bodies and matter around us. 
And once we realie this, we can begin to see how our agency is not determined by the extent to which our 
bodies maintain a fixed, impervious, self-contained existence, traceable to some celestial or metaphysical 
arrangement of the universe, but the extent to which they are continuously able to become-with the universe.  
As Braidotti writes, “the point is not to know who we are, but rather, what, at last, we want to become, and 
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how to represent mutations, changes and transformations” towards that end.77 In the context of criminal 
violence, then, we cannot think about criminal violence using binary divisions like ‘human’ and ‘nonhuman’, 
for that produces an inaccurate picture of precisely what criminal violence entails.  Even human criminal 
violence involves non-human components – insects, the wind, microscopes and radiographic machines. I 
propose, instead, that we imagine criminal violence as posthuman, both mindful of but not enslaved by the 
conventional categories of human and nonhuman, and the associated idea that bodies are singular, self-
contained and bounded entities.  Criminal violence is a series of material enactments that can represent 
‘mutations, changes, and transformations’ of the historically human. All that this requires, then, is a desire 
on our part to be more than just human. 
 
 
  
 
77 Braidotti, Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming, p. 2. 
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